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ADMIRALTY.
Cases seleded by HORACE L.

CzvNZY.

jBILLS
ov LADING.

i. Exemptionfrom Liability-GeneralAverage.
A bill of lading which exempts the ship and owner from loss arising
from any danger or accident incident "to navigation or transportation,.
receipt, delivery, storage or wharfage, any fire, collision, explosion of any
kind, wetting, combustion or heating," does not include an exemption
from liability in general average. Exemption from the ordinary liabili,
ties of a carrier should be expressed in clear and definite language.
A bill of lading which exempts the ship and owner from loss by "fire
or wetting" does not include an exemption from liability to contribute
in general averpfe for 'loss of cargo by water poured thereon to extinguish a fire.
Quare. Whether it is competent for a common carrier to exempt
itself from liability as against general average contribution : "The Roanoke," District Court of the United States, Eastern District of Wisconsin,
December 12, 1892, JENKINS, J., 53 Fed. Rep., 370.
Recitals as to Cargo Received not Conclusive-Mistake in
Tally.
A ship does not guaranteeithat the amount of cargo recited in her bills
of lading as received on board, and based on her tally, has been actually
so shipped and received; nor can the vendor and vendee of such goods,
'by any private arrangement, make the ship an insurer of the correctness
of her tally, as against fraud or mistake, for their benefit, and as a fulfillment of the vendor's contract, when not fulfilled in fact; and where there
is proof of fraud or mistake the ship and owners cannot be held accountable to the consignee beyond the quantity actually received on board:
1"The Asphodel," District Court of the United States, Southern District
of New York, January 23, 1893, BROWN, J., 53 Fed. Rep., 835.
2.

COLLISION.

3. Damages-TotalLoss-Subsequent Freight-Bounties.
In case of destruction of a vessel by collision the recovery is limited
to her value, with interest from the time of the loss, and freight which
would have been earned on the particular voyage, and there ca4 be no
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rec6very of net freight which would have-been earned on . subsequent
-voyage from the port of immediate destination, and for -which the vessel
was already engaged,
In case df destruction by collision, the fact that the vessel wouild have
been ,able to earn a bounty under the law of her nationality is an element of value proper to be conlidered, ,but no allowance can bemade for
bounty: Fabre v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd., Circuit Court of Appeals.
of the United States, Second District, October 4, 1893, WALLACE, J., 53
Fed. Rep., 288:
4.

Jurisdictionof State Courts to Enforce Lien given by State
Laws.
The courts of a State have jurisdiction to enforce by a proceeding in
:r-em liens given by its laws for labor and materials furnished in constructingor repairing domestic vessels, notwithstanding Rev. St. U. S.; J 563,
subd. 8, and
711, subd. 3, giving the United States District Courts
exclusive jurisdiction of "all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jisdiction, saving to suitors the right of a common-law'remedy in all.
cAses where the common a is competent to give it: Atlantic Works.
v:"TheGlide," SupremejudcialCourt ofeMassachusetts, January 4,1893,
, HLMws, J., MORTON and KNOWLTON, J.J., dissenting, 33 N. R.Rep.,

CARRIERS AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES..
Cases selected by OwAN W-ISTUR.'
COMBINATIONS TO MAINTAIN RATIES.
.

i. Restraintof Trade-Act ofJuly 2, 189o, Sec. <.
An agreement between several competing railway companies, and
the formation of an association thereunder for the purpose of maintainingjust and reasonable rates, preventing unjust discrimination's by furnishing adequate and equal facilitiks for the interchange of traffic between
the several lines without preventing or illegally limiting competition, is
n;t an agreement, combination or conspiracy in restraint of tradein vio.
lation of the Act of July 2, x89o,
1. Where each company, by such agreement, maintains -its own organization as before, elects its own offi-'
cers, delegates no powers to the assodiation to govern in. any respect the
operations or methods of transacting the routine business of the several
cdmpeting lined, but simply requires that each company shall charge just
and regsonable rates, and provides for certain regulations in regard to'
'-changes in such rates, such contract or agreement is not forbidden by
public policy as amounting to a transfer of the franchises and corporate ,
powers of such companies. It was not the intention of. Congress to
include common carriers subject to the Act of February4, 1.8.7x within
During the temporary absence of Mr. Wister, cases in this department will. be seledted by one of the editors of the journal. •
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the provisions of the Act of July 2, i8go, which is a special statute, relating to combinations in the form of trusts and conspiracies in restraint of
trade: United Sates v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, Circuit Court,
District of Kansas, RINER, J., November 28, 1892, 53 Fed Rep., 440..
FREIGHT, RzvuSAL TO DELIVER.
2.

Statutory Penalty-InterstateCommerce.

In an action against a carrier to recover the statutory penalty for.
refusing to deliver flour shipped from St. Louis, Mo., to Brenham, Tex.,
directed to plaintiff by the bill of lading, it appeared that the company of
which the purchase was made, acting for plaintiff; delivered the car to the
St. L., A, & T. road, a common carrier into Texas, making connections
with the G., C. & S. F. road and defendant road, both leading to Brenham. The bill of lading stated that the freight was to be carried via the
G., C. & S. F., on which-the established rate on flour was 40 cents per
loo pounds, but it was turned over to defendant, on which the established
rate was 53 cents, and by defendant carried to Brenham. On the arrival
of the car plaintiff offered defendant the amount named in the bill of
lading-4o cents per ioo-which was declined, and the amount of its
established rate demanded, which plaintiff refused to pay.. Held, thpt
the flour was interstate commerce, and as defendant would have been
answerable under the. acts of Congress requiring an established rate for
freight, and making it- a misdemeanor to accept more or loss than 53
cents, the statute of Texas imposing a penalty for a refusal to deliver
freight on tender of the charges specified in the bill of lading would not
apply: Dilligham v. Fishl, Court'of Civil Appeals of Texas, PIUASANTS, 3., December 15, X892, 21 S. W. Rep., 554.

3. InterstateCommerce. See also CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.
INTERSTATE CoxMERc
4.

ACT.

See also CONSTITUTIONAI. LAW.

Short Haul Clause-JointandLocal Rates.

The long and short haul clause of the Interstate Commerce Act (Q4).
does not apply to a case where the short haul rate is the combined local.
rates of two connecting lines, and the lower long haul rate is a joint rate
made by the two lines acting together; and an indictment alleging such.
rates is bad: United States v. Mellen, District Court, District of Kansas,.
RINER, J., November 28, 1892, 53 Fed. Rep., 229. Following Railway Co..
v. Osborne, 52 Fed. Rep., 912.
MEAsuRz ov DAmAGuS.
s.

Delay in ForwardingBaggage.

The measure of a passenger's damages for a carrier's delay in forwarding her trunk is the valfte of the use of the property during the
delay: Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. to. v. Vancil, Court of Appeals of Texas,
COLLARD, J., February 8, 1893, 21 S. W. Rep., 303.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
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CONSTITUTIONAL. LAW.

Cases selected by WILLIAM STRU.TERS Er"IS.
FUDURAL.
CONTRACTS.

s. ImpairingObligationof Contractin CorporateCharter.
Before the adoption of a requirement of a State Constitution that
"the general assembly shall provide by general laws for the organization
af-all corporations thereafter created, which laws may at any time be
altered or repealed," certain street railway companies had been incorporated and authorized to cotistruct and operate street railways on all or
any of the streets of a certain city, without any reservation of power to.
alter or repeal their charters. After the Constitution took effect these
'companies became consolidated into one'corporation, pursuant to the
of the code of the State fdr the consolidation of railr6ad and
-provisions
street railroad companies: Hed,that as no intention to subject the'previously existing charters to alteration or repeal appeared iit the new Constitution'or-the subsequent legislation, the consolidation did .not subject.,
rights granted by the original charters to the.dofiiinion of the State.
Neither the State, nor the city under authority delegated by the State,
could prohibit the consolidated company from occupying a street in the
city, iii he exercise of the right granted by the original charters, and as
sich.prohibition would impair the obligation of those charters, a suit by
t "econsolidated company to restrain the city from interfering with such,
use of the street by the company involved a federal- qu6stion; Citizens'
Street Railway Co. v. City of Memphis, Circuit Court, Western District
of Tennessee,.Jauary 4, 1893, HAMMOND, J., 53 Fed. Rep., 7r5.
See also CRRIZRS AND TRANSPORTATION
INThRSTATE COMM=RCm.
.
COMNANIS.
-2.. Foreign Corpboration.
*

A corporation doing business in one -Statesold goods to be transferred
and delivered to a person doing business in another State, and in an action
for the price it was contended by the piirchaser that the failure of the
cbtorporation to file a copy of its articles with the secretary of the State of
which the purchaer w'as a resident, in compliance with'a statute of said
'Site,'was a bar to recovery: Held, that the transaction was an act of interstate commerce, and even if the statute could be held applicable it would
viblife the c6inmdrce clause 'ofthe'Federal Constitution, and consequently
cannot defeat the action for the price: Lyons-Thomas Hardware Co.- v.
Reading Hardware Co., Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, TARZVON, C. J.,
February 7, 1893, 21 S. W. Rep., 300.
3. Jurisdicionof FederalCours4
The constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts in "cases
iii law and equity," does not authorize those courts to use their powers
nierey in aid of an investigation before an administrative body. Consequently so much of the twelfth section of the Interstate Commerce Act

CORPORATIONS.
as assumes to authorize the circuit courts to make orders enforcing subpcnas issued by the interstate commerce commission is unconstitutional: In re Interstate Commerce Commission, Circuit Court, Northern
District of Illinois, December 7, 1892, GRZSHAM, Circ. J., 53 Fed. Rep.,
476.
4. State PoliceLaws-OriginalPackage.In the absence of proof that alum in baking powder is deleterious to
health, Gen. Laws Minn., 1889, c*7, ? I, as amended by Gen. Laws Minn.,
89!, c. II9, declaring it a misdemeanor to sell baking powder containing
alum, unless the package have a label stating that it contains alum, violates Const. U. S., Art I, 8, granting to Congress the power to regulate
interstate commerce, in so far as it relates to original packages imported
from another State: In re Ware, Circuit Court, Dist. Minnesota, Third
Division, SANBORN, J., June 29, 1892, 53 Fed. Rep., 783.
RAILROADS.
s. Regulation of RailroadTraffic-InterstateCommerce.
A State statute, which declares that "all regular passenger trains
shall stop a sufficient length of time at the railroad station of county
seats to receive and set off passengers with safety" applies to a train
designated as a "fast mail train," used mainly for carrying.the mail, but
which also has coaches for the use of passengers, and which passes
through part of the corporate limits of a county seat, though it does not
pass the regular passenger station at that place. Said statute, applied to
a train employed in interstate commerce, is not a regulation of such
commerce, for the reason that the statute imposes no restrictions upon
the introduction or transportation of any article of commerce, and is but
a proper exercise of the police power of the State, inasmuch as.it carries out the requirements for the comfort, safety and welfare of the
people. The fact that Congress has aided several States by the donation
of public lands for the construction of railroads, which eventually form
one continuous line, and carry the mail from one State to another, does
not relieve the companies operating such roads from the control of the
States under whose laws they are respectively organized, even in regard
to the trains carrying mail from State to State: Illinois Central R. R. Co.
v. People, Supreme Court of Illinois, MAGRUDER, J., November 2, 1892,
33 N. E. Rep., 173.

CORPORATIONS.
Cases selected by LEWis LAwRNCE SMiTH.
CHARTER.
i. Where its Validity may be Attacked.
The validity of a corporation cannot be considered by an auditor
appointed to distribute the proceeds of a sheriff's sale of the corporation
effects: Prouty v. Prouty & Barr B. & S. Co., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, PIR CuIAm, January 30, 1893, 25 Atl. Rep., iooI.

506

CORPORATIONS.

I-

Number of Stockholders Necessary.-Acquisftion of Entire
Stock by one Individul-Liabilityfor CorpiorateDebts.
Under the general Statutes of Kentucky, "any number of persons
may associate themselves together" for incoiporatiofi. All of the.stock
was purchased, after a regular incorporation, by one man, who transacted the business of the corporation in good faith, and in the course
of such business the corporation became accommodation indorser of
certain drafts. The holder of these drafts obtained judgment, and sought
to obtain a dividend from the assignad estate of. the sole stockholder.
The Court, stating that the statute requirnd more than one person to
make a valid corporation, nevertheless decided that the corporation was
not dissoived by the acuisition of all of the stock by one man,, but that
the operation of -its charter was suspended until other persons became
stockholders; and, furthermore, that the sole stockholder, in the absence
of fraud, :was not personally liable for the debts of-the corporatiol:
Louisville Banking Co. v. Zisenman, Court of Appeals of Kentucky,
-PRYOR, J., February 25, 1893, 21 S. W. Rep., 531.
2.

to [Proceedings..
3. Forfeitureof Charter-Parties
*
In an action by the State to forfeit a corporatioh's charter for want
of substantial compliance with the statutory requirement in 'its formation, viz., that the articles of incorporation had been acknowledged by
fonr instead of five persons, as required by the Statute, the co-poration
is a necessary party defendant, and making it such is not an admission
of its corporate character, so as to preclude the State from questioning
its fight to corporate existence: People v. Stanford, iS Pac. Rep., 85; i9
Pac. Rep., 693, and 77 Cal., 360, distinguished: People v. Montecilo
- Water Co., Supreme Court of California, TRmPLB, C., February 9, 1893,
32 Pac. Rep., 236.
In an action under the Code 6f Alabama, for acting as a corporation,
wiihout being incorporated, against the officers of the alleged corporation, a different conclusion was reached from that arived at in the preceding case; and it was held that the corporation was not a proper party.
The case of People v. Stanford, 77 Cal., 360, was-regarded as destroying
the effect of People v. Flint, relied on in People v. Montecilo Water Co.:
rel., Sauche zr. Webb, Supreme Court of Alabama, HARArSON,
Stteex
- J., JaiiuarY 31 1893, 12 So. Rep., 377.4.

Forfeitureaf FranchisesInduced by Action of State Authorities. See infra, 6, 7.

DIVIDENDS.
5. All the Stockholders have the Right to Partiifiate.
Where a corporation declares a dividend on all its stock except the
shares named in a certain certificate, the owner of such certificate may
sue the corporation for the dividend on his shares. Such an exception is
void. Moreover, the purchaser of such stock who has possession of the
certificate, and who has applied to the corporation to have the stock
transferred to him on its books, may sue the corporation for a dividend
due on his stock, without first compelling a transfer of the stock to him

CRIMINAL LAW.
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by a proceeding in equity: Hill v. Atoka Coal & M. Co., Supreme Court
of Missouri, BURGSS, J., February 14, 1893, 21 S. W. Rep., 5o8.
FHARWBISUS.
6. Appfropriated by Another Corporation.
One public corporation cannot take the franchise of another, which
is in use, unless expressly authorized by the legislature, and then only
by regular condemnation, and cannot take it at all if such taking will
materially affect its use: Fidelity T. & S. V. Co. v. Mobile S. Ry. Co.,
Circuit Court, Southern District, Alabama, TouLMIN, D. J., October 22,
1892, 53 Fed. Rep., 687.
7. Similarity of Names of Two Associations-Forfeiture of
Charter.
Members of a voluntary association cannot enjoin a corporation from
acting under its charter, because it uses the name of the voluntary association; for the charter, having been granted by the legislature, can only
be forfeited and revoked by the legislature, or at the suit of the State.
Nor can the members of the association maintain a bill to enjoin the use
of the name of the corporation, since the act of incorporation fixed the
name such corporation was to bear, and since the right to use that name
was part of its franchise, conferred on it by law: Pauline v. Portuguese
Ben. Association, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, MATTIESON, C.- J.,
January 28, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep., 36.
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS.
8.' Normal Schools.
Normal schools are not public or quasipublic corporation&under the
laws of Pennsylvania, and their property is subject to mechanics' liens:
McLeod v. Central Normal School, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
CLARK,J., February 6, 1893, 25 At. Rep. iO9; 32 W. N. C., 37,.
STOCK.
9. Transfer of Shares by Corporation acting upon Power of
Attorney which has beenforged-Liabilityfor. See EVIDZNCX.

CRIMINAL LAW.1
BURGLARY.
What Constitutes.
x.
Where a person enters the chimney of a storehouse at the top,
intending to go down such chimney into the store to steal, he is guilty:
of burglary, though he does iot in fact get through the chimney into the
building where the goods are: Olds v. State, Supreme Court of Alabama,
HARALSON, J., February 6, 1893, 12 So. Rep., 409.
1

The cases in Criminal Law and Criminal Practice this month were

selected by one of the Editors.

CRIMINAL PRACTICE.
MURDER.

2. Duress of Third Persons.
On a trial for murder, after defendant testified that two men threatened to take his life unless he killed deceased, the Court refused to
instruct the jury that if defendant killed deceased "under threats of
immediate impending peril to his own life, such as to take away the free
agency of defendant, then he'is not guilty." Held, that the refusal so to
charge was proper, because, aside from the common-law rule that taking
'the life of an innocent person cannot be justified on a plea of compulsfon, the charge ignored the evidence in the case that defendant, after
being informed ly the men that he must kill deceased, went with them
some distance to deceased's hoiase without seeking to escape: Arp v.
.State, Supreme Court of Alabama, CoLEMAN, J., January 26i 1893, 12 So.
Rep., 3o1.

CRIMINAL PRACTICE.
JURISDICTION.
,I. Accomplice, Jursdictionto Try-Acts Committed in Another
County.
The District Court of a county in Fhich a murder was committed has
jurisdiction to tr; an accomplice, though all the acts constituting
defendant such accomplice were committed in another county: Carlisle
v. ,State, Court of Criminal Appeal, Texas, HURT, P. J., February ii,
1893,-21'S. W. Rep., 358.
Q

,ZSTIONS OV LAW.2. Power of_Jury to Determinein Criminal Cases.-

The doctrine that jurors are paramount judges of the law as well as
of the facts in criminal cases, is contrary to the common law, contrary
to Constitution, Chapter I, Articles I, IV, guaranteeing every person "a
certain remedy'" for all wrong , conformable to the laws, and that he
shall-not be deprived of liberty, "except bythe laws;" contraryto R. L.,
H 1699, 170o, relative to the reservation of questioAs of law to the
Supreme Court after a verdict of guilty; and contrary, also, to Fed.
Const., Art VI, declaring such-Constitution, and all laws in pursuance
thereof, the supreme law, binding on all judges in every State: State v.
Croteau, 23 Vt., 14, overruled: State v. Burpee; Supreme Court' of
Vermont, THompsoN, J., February i9,1892, 25 AUt. Rep., 964.
WITNIss- , COMPEXTNCY Or.
3. Pardon-StatutoryPardon under State Law-Evidence of a
PardotzedCriminalin Trial in U. S. Courts.
The competency of witnesses in criminal trials in the National
Courts, in the absence of special provision by Congress, .is to be determined by the law of the State where the trial takes- place as it existed

-
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when the judiciary act of 1789 was passed. A person who has been convicted and sentenced in the Courts of Pennsylvania for murder is
incompetent to testify in the National Courts unless such disability has
been removed by a pardon. The Pennsylvania statute providing that the
enduring of the punishment shall have the like effect and consequences
as a pardon by the governor amounts to a legislative pardon, and enables
such person to testify in criminal trials in the National Courts : United
States v. Hall, District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania, BUrF'NGTON, 3.,
December 17, 1892, 53 Fed. Rep., 352; 32 W. N. C., xio.
WRIT OV ERROR CORAm NowIs.
4. Pleading Guilty under Fearof Mlob Violence.
Where the accused in a criminal prosecution in the district court is
forced, through well-grounded fears of mob violence, to plead guilty to
the criminal charge, and to be sentenced to imprisonment and hard labor
in the penitentiary for a term of years, he has a right to relief from such
sentence and plea by an action or proceeding in the same court in the
nature of a writ of error coram nobis. And in such a case, where the
accused was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period
of forty-two years, and after having served more than seven years of thatterm he commences an action in the nature of a writ of error coram nobi's
to set aside such sentence and plea, his action is not barred by any statute
of limitations, for the reason that no statute of limitations will operate
against the remedy of a party while he is under the legal disability of
imprisonment: State v. Calhoun, Supreme Court of Kansas, VALBNTInE,
J., January 7, 1893, 32 Pac. Rep., 38.

EQUITY.
Cases selected by RoBERT P. BRADFORD.
FRAUD.
1. Attorney and Client-Adverse Title.
The relation of attorney and client is most confidential, and while it
in the slightest degree continues the former cannot acquire a title
adversely to the latter in the property to which the relation attaches:
Sullivan v. Walker, Supreme Court of Mississippi, COOPER, J., December
X9, 1892, 12 So. Rep., 250.
2. Conveyance-Bona Fides of Purchaser.
W, with a view to defraud his creditors, and with a knowledge of
such purpose by the husband of S, transferred his property to S for a
reasonably adequate consideration, which transfer S, acting on the husband's advice, accepted. Held, that S was not chargeable with her
husband's knowledge of W's purpose, unless actually brought home to
her: Bruen v. Dunn, Supreme Court of Iowa, GIvRN, J., January 31,
1893, 54 N. W. Rep., 468.

'EVIDENCE.
3. MaritalRights.
A disposition of her property by a woman about, to marry without
the consent of her intended husband is a fraud upon his rights unless
the consideration is a valuable one. The benefit of children by a former
marriage is not such a valuable consideration. In North Carolina
neither constructive nor actual notice before the marriage will bar the
husband's right to ket aside such a conveyance made after the engagement: Ferebee.v. Pritchaid, Supreme Court of North Carolina, SuEPHERD, C. J., February 21, 1893, x6 S. R. Rep., 9o3.
.TtUSTZEs.

4.'"Aecounting-Laches of cestui que trust.
In cases of continuing trusts that are strictly such, and recognized
and enforced in courts of equity only, so long as thi relation of trustee
and cestui que trust continues to exist, no length of time will bar the
cestui que trust of his rights in the subject of the. trust as against the.
trustee, unless circumstances exist to raise a presumption from lapse of
,time of an extinguishment of the trust, or unless there has been an open.
denial or repudiation of the trust brought home to the knowledge of the..
cestui que trust, which would require him to act is Upon, an asserted.
adyerse title. Laches is a neglect to do something that by law a man is
obliged or in duty bound to do, and the 'application of this doctrine
depends'entirely upon the circumstances of each particular case: Anderson v. Northrop, Supreme Court of Florida, TAYLOR, J., December 28,
1892, 12 So. Rep., 318.

EVIDENCE.'
Cases selected by Hj3NRY N. SsrLTz.
FORGURY.
i.' Attempted Copies of SignatureFound.
In an action against a corporation for permitting a transfer of shares
of its capital stock to be made on its books under a power of attorney
alleged to have been forged by the transferee, to whorli new certificates
were issued, a number of forged signatures of the name~of the owner of.
the stock found in the transferee's desk in various stages of execution,
some written in full and some halfwritten, are admissible as showing the
means by which the forgeries in question were effected, and the individual
by whom
they.had been perpetrated: Penna. Co. v. Phila., G. & N. PL R."
Co.,2 Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, PsR CuRIAm, following opinion of
THAYER, P.3. of Commoni Pleas, No. 4, of Philadelphia County, February 6, 1893, 25 Atl. Rep., 343; 31 W. N. C.
See CRIfINAl"
WITNEsss.
COmpZEaNCY Or PARDOND FELON.
PRAOTICP, 3.

'This department this month was in charge of one of the Editors.
'This case will be annotated in June number.
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INSURANCE.
Casesselected by Hon-cu L. CHZVNZY.
Vmu INSURANCE.
I.

Conditions of Policy-ForeclosureSale.

An advertisement and sale of insured property under a power contained in a mortgage is not a violation of a policy of insurance which
provides that it shall be void on the entry of a decree of foreclosure
of the insured property, since, though the foreclosure sale be
regarded as equivalent to a decree of sale by a court of equity, such
decree does not pass title until ratified by the Court: ITanover Fire Ins.
Co. v. Brown, Court of Appeals of Maryland, BRYAN, J., January 19,

1893, 25 Atl. Rep., 989.
LIB INSURANCE.
2.

Mutual Benefit Insurance-Beneficiary-DependentPersoAffianced Wife.
Where a mutual benefit society, organized for the benefit of relatives
and persons dependent on members, issues a certificate payable to the
member's "affianced wife," the question whether she was really dependent on thd member, and was, therefore, entitled to be a benficiary, is a
question of fact. Where the affianced wife was, during the entire period
of her engagement, working for her own living, earning during part of
that time more than her intended husband, and receiving nothing from
him except occhsional presents of clothing and money, she is not "dependent" on him: Alexander v. Parker, Supreme Court of Illinois,
MAGRUDIR, J., January I8, 1893, 33 N. R. Rep., 182.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW.
Cases selected by MAYNn R. LONGsTRnTE.
CLASSIFICATION OF CITIS-POWFRS OF CERTAIN CLASS TO L1EGISLATE
FOR GENERAL WZLFAR.

'. City OrdinanceConcerningAnimals in Street, Validity of.
Where the general statutes authorize cities of the second and third
class to regulate the running at large of animals in the street, but do not
expressly give the same powers to cities of the fourth class, such cities
cannot exercise that power under the general welfare clauses in their
charters: Wilson v. Beyers, Supreme Court of Washington, DUNBAR, J.,
December 1, 1892, 32 Pac. Rep., go.
That such power is given by'the general welfare clause, see City of
Waco v. Powell, 32 Tex., 258; CoM. v. Bean, 14 Gray, 52; that it is not
given, see Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky., 86; and Collins v. Hatch, iS Ohio,
523.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW.

CUSTOMS IjUTnS.
2. Construction ofLaws-:-Duty oh.Knit Woolen Clothing.
In" construing tfe Tariff Act of Octob&r I, i8go, the Court will, in a
proper case, as an aid to interpretation, consider the fact that the general
idea of the statute is that of protection to American mahufactifres, and
this idea suggests that an article which has been subjected to an additional process of manufacture is subject to a higher rather than an equal
or lower. rate -of duty. Knit woolen underclothing is dutiable as
-"woolen wearing apparel," and not as "knit fabrics:" Arnold, Constable & Co. z'. United States, Supreme Court of the United States,
BRXw.R, J., February 6, 1893, 13 S. C. Rep., 466.,
F'L :cTIO~s.

.

-

3. Female,Suffrage'-ShbolElections.
Although the Constitution of a State may limit the elective ftanchis6
to "male citizens of the United States," nevertheless an Act entitling
women to vote at school electiQns is constitutional, iks'applied to elections of membera of boards of education, if, they are offitefs who are not
named in the Consfitution, and concerning the munner of whose election
the legislature has, therefore, discretionar, powel-: Phimmer z. Yost,
Supreme Court of Illinois, BAILaV, C. I., January i9, x893, 33 N. B.
Rep., I9I. Following Belles v. Burr, 76 Mich.; Wheeler v. Brady, 15
Kan., 26; State v. Cones, 15 Neb., 444; and Opinion cf the Judges, 15S

Mass., 603.
LpcAL ASSnSSMXNTS.
.4.
MlunicipalImprovements.
Constitutional provisions that taxation "shall be equal and uniform,"'and that "no one species of property shall be-taxed higher than
any other species of equal value," forbid any legisldtion authorizinglocal assessments on the part of a city for public improvements. The
doctrine of local assessments proceeds upon the false assumption that
the abutting property is exclusively benefited by the improvement. If
this be so, then the right of the public to tax the owner at all for that
purpose fails, because the. public has no right to tax a citizen to make
1him build improvements for his own benefit only. Taxation must be for
a puTlic purpose, and being so, must be equal and uniform throughont
the division laying the tax: City of Norfolk v. Chamberlain, Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia,, RICHARDSON, J., December 15, 1892,
16 S: R. Rep., 73 o .
The leading case ofPeople v. Mayor, 4 N. Y., 419; criticized at length
and disapproved; opinions of Chief justice MARSHAir, in Bank v. Billings,
,4 Pet., 514, and McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 428, upon taxation,
distinguished. Id.
PUBLIC OrVICURS.

5.

Eligibility-Naturalizationof Alien after Election.

In the absence of any constitutiondl or statutory provisions as to the
qualifications of officers, a person who at the time of his 'election as
sheriff is an alien, and is consequently ineligible to hold office, may,
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remove the disability and entitle himself to the office by being naturalized as a citizen before his induction to office. And this is so though
Section 692 of the Code provides for contesting elections to county
dffices upon the ground, among others, that the person declared elected
"was not eligible to the office at the time of his election," for any person who can qualifyhimself in time to take and hold the office is eligible'
to it at the time of the election: State v. Van Beek, Supreme Court of
Iowa, GIVzN, J..(ROBINSON, C. J., and GRANGER, J., dissenting), February 2, 1893, 54 N. W. Rep., 526.
6.

Salary-Right of de jure Officer after Payment to de facto

Officer.
Where a county has once made payment of the salary of a county
office to one actually in possession of the office, performing its duties
with color of title, before his right to the office has been determined
against him by a competent tribunal, it cannot afterward be compelled
to pay the same salary to the de jure officer; State v. Milne, Supreme
Conrt of Nebraska, NORVAL, J., February 15, 1893, 54 N. W. Rep., 521.
Following Steubenville v. Cull, 38 Ohio St., i8; Wayne Co. v. Benoit, 20
Mich., 176; Hagan v. City of Brooklyn, 126 N. Y., 643; Saline Co. v.'
Anderson, 20 Kan., 298; State v. Clark, 52 Mo., So8; Shannon v. Portsmouth, 54 N. H., x85; Michel v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann., 1O94.
The de jure officer may, however, recover from the de faco incumbent the salary and emoluments received while in office after deducting
the expenses incurred in earning them: Mayfield v. Moore, 53 Ill., 528;
Dolan v. Mayor, 68 N. Y.. 274; Douglass v. State, 31 Ind., 429.
Some jurisdictions, however, hold that the dejure officer can recover
from the county in spite of payment to the de facto officer: Mayor v.
Woodward, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.), 499; People v. Smith, 28 Cal., 21; Carroll
v. Siebenithaler, 37 Cal., 193.
See also dissenting opinion of COOLZY, J., in Wayne Co. v. Benoit,
20 Mich., 176.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
Cases seleeted by ARDEMus STEWART.
PLEADING.
AB ATiMcNT.

1. Action PrematurelyBrought-Reformationof Instrument.
A plea in abatement is the proper mode of raising the question that
an action on a note is prematurely brought, when such fact does not
appear on the face of the note; but, when there are coupled with the plea
matters which show that it can only be sustained by proof of facts necessitating a reformation of the instrument, the pleading will be insufficient
unless it contains a prayer for reformation: Scott v. Norris, Appellate
Court of Indiana, R.EIHARD, C. J., February 4, E893, 33 N!. E. Rep., 227.
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2. PartialDefects.
A demurrer which is addressed to'only a part of a -plea is untenable,
and the remedy for such partial defects is by motion to strike out, by
objeqtions to evidence, or by instructions to the jury to disregard the
defective allegations: Corpening v. Worthington, Supreme Court of Alabama, HARAIroN, J., February 6, 1893, 12 So. Rep., 426.
MISJOnMER OF CAUSES.
3. Election after Trial--DemurrerOre Tenus.
Where a single count of a complaint contains two causes of action,
one in tort and the other in contract, and plaintiff is allowed, over defendat's objection, to introduce evidence to sustain both causes, the -erroris
not cured by plaintiff's election, after the trial, to recover in contract
*only, when the judgment rendered does not limit plaintift's recovery of
costs to those incurred in the action in contrast. Where an action is
brought before a justice it is not too lath to raise the question of misjoin'der of issues on a demurrer ore tenus in the Circuit Court on appeal:
'Wirth v. Bartlett, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, ORTON, J., January 3z,•
" i8g3,54N. W. Rep., 399.
LOT IUNS

PRACTICE.

1. Abuse of Discretion.
On an application by plaintiff for a continuance, his affidavits showed
that he had used due diligence to prdpare for trial, setting oufin detail
the nature and kind of diligence, and that the most materiql and necessary witness, a non-resident, was so sick that he could -ot give his depositioni, and that no other witness was known to plaintiffby whom he could'
prove what he expected to prove by this witness. The affidavit also set
out what plaintiff expected to prove by such witness, clearly establishing
the materiality of the testimony. Held, that a refusal'to grant a continuance was such an injudicious use of discretion as to warranta reversalDavis & Rankin Bldg. & Mfg Co. v. Riverside Butter & Cheese Co.,
Suprime Court of Wisconsin,
,, 3.,
Jln January 31, 1893, 54 N. W.

Rep.,5o6.
REMovAl, OF CAusEs.
2. Time of Removal-Filing Pleadingsin State Court.
It is not necessary, in order to the removal of a cause, that any pleading on behalf of aefendant should first be filed in the State court; and
decisions by a'State court that such filing is necessary are not binding
upon the Federal- courts: Egan v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.. Circuit
Court of the Northern District of Iowa, E. D., SXmAS, Dist. J., January 21,1893, 53 Fed. Rep., 675.

SURVICU oF PROCESS.
3. Leaving Copiy atHouse.
Where a person disappears from home, without any expression of
an intention not to return, process left with his wife, nine days after his
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disappearance, at his usual place of abode, is a sufficient service to give
the court jurisdiction: Botna Valley State Bank v. Silver City Bank et
al., Supreme Court of Iowa, ROTHROCK, J., January 31, 1893, 54 N. W.
Rep., 472.
TROVER BY M/,BZR

OF FIRM.

4. Nonjoinderof Partner.
One partner cannot maintain trover for the recovery of property
conveyed by his co-partner in fraud of the partnership: Cornells v. Stan-.
hope, 14 R. I., 99, followed; White v. Campbell, Supreme Court of
Rhode Island, MATTMOl, C.J., January 21, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep., 40.
VARDICT.,
s. Gambling Verdict-Impfeachment by Juror.
Where a jury agree that each member thereof shall mark the sum
which he thinks the plaintiff is entitled to recover on a slip of paper,
and then ascertain by addition the amount of the sums so marked, and to
then divide said amount by twelve (the number of jurors), and that the
quotient resulting from such division shall be the amount of the verdict,
such verdict is obtained by "reso r tto a determination of chance," within
the meaning of that term as used in subdivision 2, 4439, Rev. St. 1887.
The affidavit of a juror is competent proof to show that the verdict was
so obtained: Flood v. McClure, Supreme Court of Idaho, SULLIvAN, J.,
February 3, 1893, 32 Pac. Rep., 254.

PROPERTY.
Cases selected by

WILLIAm A. DAVIS.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
i. Elevated Railways-Injuriesto Easements-Benefits.
In an action for damages to property by reason of the consiruction
and maintenance of an elevated railway, it is error to refuse to find that
the easements appurtenant to the land, and interfered with by the railway, aside from any consequential damages to the premises from the
taking thereof, have in themselves only a nominal value.
It is error to refuse to find that the only property rights of an
abutting owner in the streets taken or interfered with by the railway are
easements of light and of air and of access in and over the street.
The courts may judicially notice that an elevated railway increases
the traffic and business in the wide avenues occupied by it, even if the
evidence introduced does not show this: Bookman v. N. Y. El. R. Co.,
Court of Appeals of New York, EARL, J., February 28, 1893, 33 N. E.
Rep., 333.
LAND.
2. Chargeon Estate. •

Testator devised that portion of his premises on which a tannery
was situate, to his son John, and the portion having a mill on to his son
Joseph. The will provided: "John shall receive a deed free from all
incumbrances. It is reserved that he is"s to take water out of the mill
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race for running his tannery, for which he "shall tan yearly, for my son
Joseph, one calf skin and one beef hide," free of charge: Held, that the
privileges reserved were personal to the legatees, and created no charge
on the tannery tract: Mosser v. Lesher, Sfipreme Courtof Pennsylvania,
PER CURIAM, February 13, x893, 25 AtI. Rep., io85.

TORTS.
Cases selected y ALXANDiR DURnIN LAUiR.
DiEFAMATION.
i.- Slanderof Breeding Stallion.
False and malicious statements concerning the plaintiffs' breeding
stallion are actionable, without alleging special damages, when it is
apparent from the plain terms of the declaration that the action is based,
nothonly upon the slander of the horse, but also upon the character and
credit of the plaintiffs, who are engaged in keeping the horse for hire
and gain: Henkle v. Schaub, Supreme Court pf Michigan,'LoNa, J., Feb-

ruary 3, 1893, 54 N. W. Rep., 293.
NZPGLIGUNCn"

2. Imputation of Negligence.
The deceased, who was blind, was driving with his father on a joint
enterprise when the accident happened by the concurrent negligence of
the defendant company and the father. Held,that the negligence of the
father should be imputed to the plaintiff: Johnson v.Gulf, C. &7S. F. Ry.
Co., Court of Civil Appeals, Texas, HnAD,J., January 17, 1893, 21 S. W.
Rep., 274. See annotation on the subject of imputation of negligence in
the April number of this magazine.

:WILLS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Cases selected by MAURICZ G. BimxNAP.
DOWUR.
i.

Partnership ProeryV.
A widow has no dower interest in a storehouse and lot belonging t&
the partnership of which her husband was a member. Such property is,
al part of the social assets of the firm, and is regarded as personalty, in
which the widow could participate only as a distributee: Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia, FAuiNT.ROY, J., December 15, 1892, 16 S.- .
Rep., 671.
-

WILL.
2. Devise of Same Land to Two Persons.
Where a testator, in one clause of his will, devises a tract of land in
fee, and in a subsequent clause devises the same land in fee to another
person, the two devisees will take the land as tenants in common, each
taking an undivided half: Day v. Wallace, Supreme Court of Illinois,

VILKIN, J., January 18, 1893, 33 N. E. Rep., 185.

